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FEATURE

ARTICLE

Illuminating Patient Choice
Releasing Physician-Specific Data To The
Public
by FrancesH. Miller

"Knowledge is power," Ethel Watts conflicts may be material to decisions about iniMumford once quipped, "provided you have it tiating or continuing therapy. A Louisiana court
about the right person." ' Physicians all too of- has gone even further in giving a patient a cause
ten occupy critically important roles in patients' of action against a doctor for failure to disclose
lives, but people have traditionally possessed alcohol abuse, again using a materiality ratiovery little factual information about their doc- nale.6
A patient's choice of a doctor matters
tors. Patient ignorance of their physicians' qualifications reinforces the inherent and seemingly greatly for personal autonomy reasons, whether
2
inevitable imbalance of power between them. or not formally analyzed as a right protected by
Significantly, it contributes to a patient's inabil- informed consent doctrine, but it also carries inity to evaluate medical judgment, and thus to creasing importance now that intensified comweigh the true quality of physician-patient inter- petition characterizes our rapidly restructuring
action. Such ignorance undermines personal au- health care delivery system.7 Aggressive health
tonomy, the theoretical linchpin of informed con- insurer competition for subscribers has been accompanied by escalating physician competitivesent.'
Some would argue that informed consent ness for patients, and the country's well-docudoctrine should not be extended beyond a mented oversupply of doctors merely fuels that
patient's right to information about the risks and rivalry.8 If, as predicted, 20 percent of the
benefits of recommended therapy, to satisfy doc- nation's physicians will be superfluous in the year
tors' mandatory duty of disclosFrances H. Miller is a Professorof Law, Boston University
ing information. 4 However, reSchool oj Law, and ProfessorofPublicHealth,Boston Unicent cases such as the California
versity S chool of Public Health. This article is based in
in
decision
Court
Supreme
substantialparton the FINAL REPORT OF THE MASSACHUSETrS
Moore v. Regents of the UniverADVISOR) COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PHYSICIAN
sity of California' do just that,
INFORMATION (1995) [hereinafterREPORT]. The Report was
and are grounded on the broader
the joint product of the Committee (chairedby the Honorfiduciary obligations that physiableAlbertL. KramerformerPresidingJusticeof the Quincy
dependent
to
their
owe
cians
District Court; and including Dr.Aaron Lazare, Chancelcharges. Moore made clear that
br of the University of MassachusettsMedical Center and
patients have the legal right to be
Dean of the University of MassachusettsMedical School;
told at least some personal inforand the a2uthor); and its superb staff, Penelope Wells, Genmation about their doctors when
eral Counsel, and Amy Stampfer, Special Associate Counconflicts of financial interest are
sel of the MassachusettsBoard ofRegistrationin Medicine.
present, on the ground that such
1995-1996
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patients should soon have - at least according to basic supply and demand theory - even
more substantial choice when selecting their doctors. The range of that potential choice is being
narrowed dramatically by health insurers, however, as they become increasingly selective about
the stables of "preferred" providers with whom
they will contract. 0
Competition in any market flourishes on
the basis of only two variables: price and quality. Buyers tend to gravitate to sellers offering
goods or services at the combination of price and
quality that most nearly matches their personal
preferences. However, once subscribers or their
employers pay health insurance premiums, price
drops out of the picture - or at least suffers diminished significance - as a determinant when
subscribers thereafter select their doctors. Price
also loses its significance as a factor insured patients consider when deciding whether to undergo
specific medical treatment. Quality constitutes
the only other basis on which patients can make
decisions about providers and treatment, at least
so long as competition functions as our basic
mechanism for distributing health services. But
patients must possess sufficient factual information to impart some measure of meaning to their
choices if their decisions are to constitute anything more than a charade. "I
The notion of informed choice means
very little when the physician selection criteria
generally available to a patient are limited to
which doctors are associated with the patient's
health plan; or at most, to a recommendation by
a friend who has had a satisfactory experience
with a particular physician. Convenience considerations such as geographical location and
office hours may play a large part in an initial
decision to establish a relationship with a practi-
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tioner, but these factors usually have little to do
with the clinical quality of the chosen doctor's
medical services. In reality, most patients know
precious little about the skills of those they trust
2
to treat them.'
Patient access to information about phycompetence
has always been controversician
sial, primarily because of alleged lay difficulty
in understanding sometimes complex and technical medical outcomes, which may be reported
out of context or be strongly affected by individual patient variation.' 3 This generalized objection has tended to sweep far too broadly, however, because much factual information important to patients about their doctors - for example
educational qualifications, board certification, or
even criminal conviction history - is not highly
technical, and can be readily absorbed and understood by the average person. Moreover, much
of it has already been collected under reasonably reliable circumstances in centralized data
repositories, such as those maintained by state
4
medical licensing boards and health insurers.
In addition, since the end of the 1980s,
the federal government has been compiling and
maintaining individual dossiers on the nation's
licensed physicians in the Congressionally-established National Practitioner Data Bank .11 That
database contains a variety of information related
to the quality of physicians' practices, such as
disciplinary actions against doctors by health care
facilities and licensing authorities, as well as
medical malpractice settlements and judgments
against them. Patients are not currently permitted access to the federal database, but the Data
Bank has received millions of inquiries from
hospitals, licensing boards, medical malpractice
and health insurers, physicians themselves, and
other authorized parties 6 since it began making
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information available. 7 Significantly, more than single malpractice claim has predictive value as
80 percent of its inquiries thus far have come a harbinger of subsequent claims; doctors who
from health insurers.' 8 In a time of physician have trouble in their relations with patients tend
oversupply and tighter cost containment controls, to keep having troubled patient relationships.2 '
During 1994 in Massachusetts a wella doctor with a checkered history is presumably
expendable to many managed care plans. At the publicized series of media "exposes" spotlighted
very least, such a doctor will have to contend a few allegedly egregious quality of care defiwith awkward questions about clinical compe- ciencies involving some physicians licensed in
the Commonwealth, and charged that regulatory
tence that Data Bank entries may raise.
Health insurers have been taking a more authorities and hospitals had been too lenient in
assertive role in evaluating the quality of care dealing with the targeted offenders.22 Fairly or
unfairly, this notoritheir participating
ety reinforced a
physicians deliver for
been
insurers
have
Health
long-standing pubsome time now.
lic perception that
Some physicians ar- taking a more assertive role in
the Board of Regisgue that as a consetration in Medicine
quence patients have evaluating the quality of care
(composed of five
less need for access to
doctors and two lay
potentially damaging their participating physicians
members),23 which
information about
deliver for some time now.
licenses and discitheir doctors - for example malpractice payout histories -which could plines physicians might at times be unduly sobe easily misunderstood by the lay public. Ad- licitous of physician interests. Partially in revocates of non-disclosure contend that some doc- sponse, but also because of a general sense that
tors would be unfairly prejudiced if malpractice the prior policy of non-disclosure had outlived
payout histories were available to the public. For its usefulness in the current managed care enviexample, they reason that most patients lack a ronment, Massachusetts' Secretary of Consumer
sophisticated understanding of the role some Affairs appointed an Advisory Committee on
settlements play in reducing transaction costs Public Disclosure of Physician Information.24
once a colorable malpractice claim has been The Committee was charged with considering
made, regardless of whether medical negligence "what information [currently held by the Board]
was actually involved in the particular case.' 9 to disclose and the most effective means for disOthers counter that while an individual malprac- closing it." 2
The Advisory Committee thus began its
tice allegation may or may not have anything to
do with the defendant's clinical competence on work under clear direction that fuller public disthe occasion in question, it does say something closure of Board-held information 26 would be
about the quality of the doctor-patient relation- desirable. Information currently in the Board's
ship involved.2' A recent empirical study cor- possession covers a broad range of categories and
roborates that point by indicating that even a comes from a variety of sources, including phy1995-1996
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sician self-reporting on licensure and re-licensure
applications.27 It also includes statutorily mandated reporting from courts about malpractice
tribunal findings,28 court judgments,29 and certain criminal convictions.30 In addition the Board
receives legislatively mandated reports from malpractice insurers about closed malpractice
claims,3 ' from hospitals and other health care
facilities about disciplinary actions,32 and from
professional medical associations about their
physician discipline.33 The Secretary directed the
Advisory Committee to determine exactly which
information in the Board's possession should be
disclosed, in what manner, and with what protections.
The Committee accordingly began its
work with a presumption in favor of disclosure,
and it quickly adopted the following two working principles:
1)
"All reliable information in the
Board's possession that could be helpful to the
public in choosing doctors should be released,
unless there is a compelling public policy reason for keeping it confidential, and
2)
Judgments and other dispositions
regarding a physician's competency which result from adversarial or due process proceedings,
provide reasonably reliable information. 34
After extensive public hearings and comment,
review of the relevant literature, statistics, and
other licensing authority and data bank experience, and after having received information and
analysis from many other expert sources on all
sides of the relevant issues, the Advisory Committee recommended that the Board release four
broad categories of physician-specific informa128 * Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

tion. These four categories are discussed in Part
II of this article. Most of this information is currently held in the Board's own data repository,
and the Advisory Committee specified safeguards which should accompany disclosure to
minimize both potential misunderstandings and
any unduly prejudicial impact conveyed by some
potentially damaging information.35
II.
Physician information to be
disclosed to the public
The Advisory Committee recommended
that the Board of Registration in Medicine compile and disseminate - in user-friendly format Physician Profiles containing the four categories
of information.36 The vast majority of suggested
entries relate to non-controversial "hard" factual
data in the first category, which includes general
information about physician education, training,
specialty credentialing, employment and
achievements. Only the potentially damaging
information in the other three categories, which
are concerned with: 1) malpractice claims history; 2) criminal convictions; and 3) licensing
and hospital disciplinary sanctions, presented difficult disclosure issues. However, more than twothirds of the physicians licensed in Massachusetts will have no entries at all in any of these
categories. 37 A suggested format for the physician profile was set forth by the Advisory Committee as follows in Figure 1:
Education and training
Premedical and medical education, 38 plus
postgraduate clinical training,3 9 are structural
building blocks underlying the quality of care a
doctor can deliver. These constitute the basic
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Physician Profile Format
* Name
"Office phone number(s) and address(es)
"Nature of practice (group practice, solo
practice, hospital staff)
* Number of years in practice
"Medical license status
"Premedical and medical schools, years
attended and degrees awarded
"Postgraduate training
"Specialty
"American Specialty Board certification
and recertification, and eligibility for
certification.
*Current employment, including faculty
appointments
"Health care facilities where physician
holds privileges
"Plans in which physician is a provider
"Refereed journal articles and book chapters
"Honors and awards
"Board or hospital disciplinary findings
• Criminal convictions
"Malpractice summary (compared with
norm for specialty)

post-graduate training certificates on their office
walls, but not all do, and some have multiple offices which may not each display those credentials. Moreover, patients often never even set
foot in the offices of certain facility-based specialists, such as radiologists and anesthesiologists. Thus while this core factual information
about a doctor's professional training is theoretically available to patients, it is not uniformly
available in easy-to-access ways that facilitate
comparison. As the practice of telemedicine over
long distances gains wider acceptance by the professional and patient communities, the problem
will only intensify.' The Advisory Committee
therefore recommended that the Board compile
this information in standardized physician profile format, and make it easily accessible to the
public to facilitate patient choice among doctors.
This was the easy part of the Advisory
Committee's task.
B:

Medical malpractice claims history

A great deal of physician apprehension
surrounds release of medical malpractice claims
history statistics.4 Doctors fear that patients will
misinterpret raw claims data, which may or may
not indicate problems involving clinical competence in particular cases. Although all major
Figure 1
empirical studies show that most instances of
"positive" factual information about physician chart-demonstrated medical malpractice never
42
competency. If patient self-determination means result in negligence claims, the studies also reanything, fundamental common sense dictates veal that some claims are indeed filed in cases
that patients should be entitled to know, for ex- where the record fails to demonstrate that the
ample, whether physicians holding themselves defendant doctor departed from customary stan43
out as specialists have at least gone through the dards of care. Although most physicians have
graduate training programs appropriate to qualify never had a single malpractice allegation made
them to perform up to the standard for the spe- against them in their entire professional lives, all
cialty. Doctors often hang their diplomas and are understandably vulnerable to "there but for
1995-1996
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the grace of God go I" professional anxieties.
Some doctors may thus feel reluctant to advocate a precedent that they fear - however
unfoundedly - could somehow be used (unfairly?) against them in the future.
This professional apprehension must be
weighed against the information value of a
doctor's malpractice claims history to patients.
Since the major studies all show that only 10 12 percent of chart-demonstrated medical negligence results in any claims at all,' at some point,
allegations of physician malpractice do indicate
problems; if not with pure clinical competence,
at least with the quality of doctor-patient interaction. 45 For example, a patient prepared to endure the long-term aggravation and uncertainties associated with filing a malpractice action is
usually a person very unhappy about either the
unanticipated unfortunate results of medical care,
or the medical and emotional costs of iatrogenic
injury.' If the particular result was a known
complication of a recommended procedure, a
doctor warning the patient in advance about the
risk is less likely to be the target of patient anger
should that complication in fact materialize. The
patient may not be pleased with the outcome, but
cannot claim ignorance that an unhappy result
was possible.47 The knowledgeable patient may
thus feel morally or even legally constrained from
filing a malpractice lawsuit, regardless of
whether the doctor actually provided sufficient
information to meet the legal requirements of an
informed consent.
The Advisory Committee decided for
several reasons that malpractice claims are not
on their own sufficiently reliable indicators of
questionable physician competence to warrant
public disclosure. Therefore the Committee recommended that only those claims which have
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matured after adversary proceedings to settlements, awards, or judgments in favor of patients
be made available to the public. Raw data on
claims closed with some payment to malpractice plaintiffs can indeed be highly misleading,
because those unfamiliar with malpractice litigation may be unaware that non-meritorious
claims are sometimes settled just to get rid of
the litigation costs associated with contesting
them. For this reason, the Advisory Committee
recommended that malpractice payments - including settlements - be separated into broad categories representing small, medium, and large
awards, rather than reported in specific dollar
amounts.
These reports of malpractice payments to
malpractice plaintiffs should be accompanied by
a statement drawing attention to the fact that a
small award may well represent a nuisance settlement in a case where physician negligence was
not at all clear, or even entirely absent. A larger
settlement, however, may indicate a great deal
about the seriousness of the injury and the
strength of the plaintiff's evidence of defendant's
negligence. The Advisory Committee also recommended that all malpractice payments,
whether they be settlements, arbitration awards,
or jury verdicts, be reported in a format which
compares the subject doctor's payout history with
that of other physicians in the same specialty.
In that way patients will be able to evaluate the
malpractice payment experience of, for example,
a surgeon, against the significantly higher and
more frequent experience of other surgeons,
rather than possibly being misled by comparing
it with the lower and less frequent payments made
on malpractice claims against all doctors.
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Many legislatures have sought to improve the
overall quality of care by decreasing the stigma
of hospital sanctions against doctors, with whom
States impose licensing sanctions against institutional peer reviewers often have had longphysicians as a remedy of last resort to protect standing professional and personal relationships
the public, to send deterrent messages to the pro- that might color the reviewers' willingness to
fession, and to reprimand physicians deemed to impose discipline.
have engaged in sub-standard practice. Final liThis confidentiality theory was attractive,
censing board decisions are usually a matter of but the results of confidentiality have been less
public record, available to anyone upon request. so. Both national and state statistics comparing
Some Board disciplinary proceedings receive reported hospital disciplinary actions with state
widespread media coverage in addition, particu- licensing board sanctions indicate that most hoslarly when sensational facts have been alleged. 49 pitals have been far less than aggressive in carThe Advisory Committee thus believed there was rying out their responsibilities for peer review.
no legitimate reason not to include final Board For example, a 1995 report by the U.S. Departdisciplinary actions on Board-generated physi- ment of Health and Human Services Inspector
cian profiles.
General found that about 75 percent of the
The final decisions in hospital disciplin- nation's hospitals failed to report any adverse
ary proceedings were another matter entirely. To decisions to the National Practitioner Data Bank,
begin with, Massachusetts law at the time the as required by statute, for the first three and oneAdvisory Committee was deliberating required quarter years of its existence. 3 Moreover, the
the Board of Registration in Medicine to keep Massachusetts experience was not even average;
hospital disciplinary actions reported to it pur- the Commonwealth's hospitals reported only 1.7
suant to statute confidential, except as might be sanctions per 1,000 licensed beds, giving the state
necessary for the Board to use them in its own a rank of 37th in the country on the scale of phydisciplinary proceedings against the licensee. 0 sician discipline.
Releasing those reports to the public would thus
During the same three-year time period
require statutory change, except as the parties that the country's hospitals were reporting only
themselves might choose to release them.
about 1,000 sanctions a year to the National PracThe Massachusetts legislature had pre- titioner Data Bank, state licensing boards - never
viously been persuaded that hospitals would en- known as bastions of aggressive enforcement
gage in full and frank discussion,5 culminating themselves - were taking disciplinary action
in vigorous self-regulation, if the confidentiality against approximately 8,000 doctors per year.
of institutional disciplinary actions were assured. Although some of the differential is undoubtedly
Improving the quality of hospital-based care has accounted for by licensure sanctions for physialways been considered especially important, cian misconduct occurring outside of the hospibecause the vast majority of all U.S. medical tal setting, the wide discrepancy raises questions
malpractice actions have involved allegations of about how seriously the country's hospitals have
negligence occurring within hospital walls. 2 been taking their responsibility for ensuring the
C.
Licensing Board and hospital
disciplinary actions"

1995-1996
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quality of patient care by monitoring and disciplining staff member performance. For example,
Massachusetts' 128 hospitals reported an average of only 37.5 sanctions per year to the Board
of Registration in Medicine during the three-year
period covered by the Inspector General's report, and most hospitals in the Commonwealth
consistently reported no disciplinary actions
4
whatsoever.1
Whatever the reason, the discrepancy
between reported hospital disciplinary actions
and state licensure penalties indicates that when
a hospital actually does sanction a physician, the
doctor's transgression is probably fairly clear and
reasonably serious. The Advisory Committee
thus decided after considerable deliberation that
the policy of complete confidentiality did not
seem to be achieving the intended result of more
rigorous hospital oversight and discipline. The
Committee determined that given this apparent
failure of confidentiality protection to stimulate
better peer review, there was no longer any justification for withholding from patients information about those few final Massachusetts hospital decisions which actually did sanction errant
doctors.55

to the public. Criminal convictions are considered relevant to the medical licensing function
itself, however, and doctors can lose their licenses
as a result of criminal activity, 57 even when not
directly connected with medical practice. 8
To protect the public safety, courts are
usually required to report physician convictions
of serious crimes to licensing boards, and doctors are usually required to self-report them on
licensure and re-licensure applications. 59 If licensing boards find a doctor's criminal activity
relevant to their dealings with physicians, should
patients who must trust those same doctors in
much more intimate ways be kept in the dark?
Most patients would say that moral character
affects their willingness to trust, and that criminal behavior illuminates character.
Criminal conviction information is already in the public domain, since criminal trials
are almost always public prosecutions. Patients
thus can secure conviction information about
doctors as a matter of right if only they know
where to look. Unfortunately, however, information about the criminal convictions of specific
physicians is hard for the ordinary patient to come
by, short of fortuitous media notoriety or laborious poring over often obscure court records.
6
Even if a doctor's criminal conviction were unD.
Criminal convictions
related to the practice of medicine in the narrow
A doctor's conviction of a felony or seri- sense, in that it did not involve activity directly
ous misdemeanor indicates that a jury has found connected with clinical treatment, patients may
the defendant guilty of a significant offense well consider it relevant in deciding whom to
against the public order. This raises an issue of trust about their own medical care. Respect for
moral character in the minds of many people. patient self-determination mandates that concluSome contend that if the particular crime is not sion, particularly since the doctor can claim no
directly related to the practice of medicine, pa- countervailing right of privacy.' Trust is a timetients can claim no unique right to possess that honored core ingredient of the doctor-patient reinformation, and thus medical licensing authori- lationship. 6'
ties should not be in the business of providing it
For example, a patient might rationally
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choose not to be treated by a doctor convicted of
a crime involving physical violence, such as domestic abuse, reasoning that patients are often
physically and emotionally dependent - and correspondingly especially vulnerable - in their doctors' care. Thus a doctor's assault conviction
might bear on a patient's willingness to be treated
by that particular physician. A patient might also
feel strongly about not going to a practitioner
convicted of criminal activity more closely related to medical practice, yet less directly connected to physical violence. Accordingly, a patient might quite reasonably choose to shun a
physician convicted of fabricating medical research data, or of fraud involving Medicare, Medicaid or other health insurance payments. In that
way the patient could avoid being used as an instrument of any future fraud.
A patient's reasons for choosing to avoid
- or seek out - a doctor convicted of a particular
crime need not be "rational," however, in the
sense that others would find the underlying conduct relevant in choosing their own physicians.
For example, a doctor convicted of certain acts
of civil disobedience, such as refusal to serve in
active combat or having engaged in other political protest, might repel some patients yet at the
same time attract others. Presumably some patients, or those anxious to have a particular
doctor's specialized skills, would find whatever
negative impact such a conviction might carry
outweighed by other reasons for preferring that
practitioner, so long as the physician retains a
license to practice medicine. But respect for
patient autonomy - and the fiduciary duties of
doctors in the context of their inherently unequal
relationship - would honor that preference.
All physicians convicted of crimes have
already had their days in court, where relevant

1995-1996

defenses could be raised. Juries of their peers
have nonetheless found the defendants guilty of
offenses against the public order; that is the common denominator of all convictions. Criminal
convictions are not considered private information entitled to protection from disclosure. Their
status is that of public records, unless for some
overriding reason the conviction has been sealed.
If the defendant doctor's activity was serious
enough to warrant public prosecution, and ultimately resulted in a conviction, then there seems
little justification for not making the fact of that
conviction more easily available to patients.
They have no choice but to trust that those they
choose as care providers will place patient welfare and safety above peccadillo or personal interest. A doctor's character is a critical element
of that trust.
What information did the
II.
Advisory Committee decline to
recommend be collected by the Board or
included in patient-accessible physician
profiles?
The Advisory Committee considered an
extremely broad range of issues, including
whether the Board of Registration in Medicine
ought to be collecting certain data not yet required to be reported to it, such as information
about the reimbursement incentives under certain managed care plans that might color physician recommendations for treatment. 62 It declined to recommend at this stage that such potentially controversial information be reported to
the board, so obviously it could not be made
available to patients on physicians' profiles. The
Committee adhered to its guiding principles, that
all reliable information in its possession be made
available to patients, and thatfinal decisions arFeature Articles 0 133

rived at after an adversary process constituted

reasonably reliable information.63
A.

Criminal and malpractice claims

Although some would argue that both
criminal and malpractice claims against a physician carry some information value for patients,
the Advisory Committee believed that when no
final resolution of a claim or criminal charge has
occurred, whatever informational value it might
carry is far outweighed by considerations of fairness to the accused doctor. Indeed, a patient upset
about an unavoidably bad medical result might
be irrationally driven to file a malpractice claim,
or to press a criminal charge, with no factual justification or realistic hope of success. 6' Alternatively, an angry person might simply seek to injure the reputation of a doctor with whom he or
she had a dispute unrelated to medical practice
at all. Since bare claims and charges have not
been carried through the adversarial process to
final resolution, theAdvisory Committee did not
find them sufficiently reliable indicators of physician quality or character to warrant their disclosure on Board-generated profiles available to
patients.
B.

Chemical dependency information

The Advisory Committee grappled seriously with the question of whether information
in the Board's possession concerning a doctor's
chemical dependency should be released to patients, and finally decided against it. 65 The Committee ultimately reasoned that so long as the
afflicted doctor was enrolled in and living up to
the requirements of a Board-approved comprehensive treatment and monitoring program, 66 the
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doctor's confidentiality interest in personal medical information outweighed any patient interest
in discovering potentially inflammatory details
concerning the practitioner's medical condition.
Presumably some patients would choose not to
be treated by a chemically dependent doctor.6 7
However, after extensive deliberation the Advisory Committee decided that so long as the Board
of Registration in Medicine remained persuaded
that patient care was not jeopardized by permitting the doctor to continue practicing medicine,
patient preferences would have to yield to the
doctor's own right as a patient to have confidential medical information protected from public
discovery.68 The Committee did set forth recommendations designed to ensure that the Board
continue to guarantee the appropriate level of
public safety, however. Among these was a recommendation that if the dependent doctor resumed the use of alcohol or drugs, or violated
"any other material condition" of the agreedupon rehabilitation program, and failed to selfreport, the Board institute an automatic disciplinary hearing which could result in de-licensure.
Outcomes data
Both the State of New York and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania have compiled and
released certain physician-specific data about patient outcomes to the public.6 9 The Advisory

Committee recognized the information value of
an outcomes yardstick for measuring clinical performance, and mortality and unexpected complications rates such as those used in New York
and Pennsylvania might well constitute such a
measuring device. However, the Committee also
recognized the difficulties of developing an information format sophisticated enough to account
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for variations such as differential patient age and
health status mix, yet accessible enough for the
public to understand readily.70 It also recognized
that outcomes measurements are easier to calculate for procedure-based specialties than for primarily cognitive practitioners, and might thus
give a skewed picture about where quality problems exist among the specialties. On balance,
the Advisory Committee did not believe that current outcomes measures convey sufficiently reliable information about the quality of physician
performance to warrant recommending their collection by the Board or their release to the public on physician profiles.

III.

Conclusion

Massachusetts is scheduled some time in
1996 to become the first state in the country
where the licensing authority provides consumers with standardized profiles on the physicians
licensed to practice medicine in the Commonwealth. These profiles are designed to contain
reliable, material information to help patients
better evaluate the quality of service rendered
by those they choose to treat them. The information these profiles contain will illuminate similarities and differences among physicians, and
thus should enhance the quality of patient decisions about the doctors to whom they entrust their
medical care. 7'

Appendix
Advisory Committee On Public Disclosure Of Physician
Information April, 1995
Summary of recommendations
The following is a summary of the recommendations made in the body of this report.

Physician-specific
information to be released
Medical malpractice as a matter of public
policy:
The Committee believes that reliable medical
malpractice information about a physician should
be made available to the public. Specifically,
1995-1996

the Committee recommends that the Board
isclose to the public the following:
1) all medical malpractice
court judgments and amounts;
2) all medical malpractice arbitration awards and amounts;
and
3) all medical malpractice insurance settlements and amounts.
Feature Articles * 135

tals and other health care facilities should be
Dispositions should not be reported in specific made available to the public. Specifically, the
dollar amounts; rather, they should be reported Committee recommends that the Board disclose
in at least three graduated categories suggesting to the public the following:
All final disciplinary actions taken against
the level of significance of the award or settlement [e.g., 1) minor, 2) medium, and 3) ma- physicians by hospitals and other health care facilities, including, but not limited to, denial, rejor].
Medical malpractice information should be striction or revocation of staff privileges due to
reported fairly and in context by comparing phy- incompetence or other just cause.
sicians within their particular specialties.
Pending malpractice claims should not be Need for oversight as a matter of public
disclosed to the public. Unlike judgments or policy
settlements that survive tests of adversarial or
To maintain an effective system for hosdue process proceedings, complaints are mere
pitals and other health care facilities to monitor
accusations and standing alone are not reliable
adverse events, the Committee beindicators of substandard care. These should be and address
should remain
left to the Board to investigate as a function of lieves that the peer review process
confidential to the extent that deliberations
its licensing and disciplinary responsibilities.
should not be disclosed to the public. We do,
however, recommend:
To implement the above, we recommend:
A) The Board's regulations be amended to release the above medical malpractice information:
1) received from physicians on their license applications; and 2) received from insurance companies.
B) The Board meet with the Chief Administrative Judge of the Trial Court to establish effective procedures to ensure that courts report
all medical malpractice dispositions to the Board
as required by statute.

Hospitals and health care
facility reporting
Disciplinary actions as a matter of public
policy
The Committee believes that final disciplinary actions taken against physicians by hospi136 e Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

1) hospitals and other health
care facilities be required to report all dispositions in professional conduct cases whether or
not there is a final determination
that a disciplinary action be taken;
2) hospitals and other health
care facilities be required to report all incidents of "significant
maloccurrences" whether or not
harm results, including actions
taken to prevent recurrence; and
3) the Board be granted authority on a confidential basis to
inspect internal documents of
hospitals and other health care facilities to verify the accuracy and
completeness of their disciplinary and incident reports.
Volume 8, number 2

To implement the above, we recommend:
Mass. Gen. L. ch. 221, § 26 be amended to
To implement the above, we recommend:
Mass. Gen. L. ch. 11, § 53 be amended to require courts to report to the Board all convicallow the Board to disclose to the public infor- tions of felonies and misdemeanors whether or
mation contained in hospital and other health care not related to the practice of medicine.
The Board's regulations be amended to release
facility final disciplinary action reports.
The Board's regulations be amended to per- information concerning the above criminal conmit disclosure of formation regarding final dis- victions received from physicians on their licensciplinary actions taken against a physician re- ing applications.
ported by the physician on his/her license applications.
Physician chemical dependency as a
matter of public policy
Criminal charges and convictions as a
The committee believes that information conmatter of public policy
cerning a physician's chemical dependency that
The Committee believes that information re- is not the subject of disciplinary action should
garding a physician's criminal convictions of be confidential provided that the physician is
serious charges should be made available to the successfully undergoing or has successfully compublic. Specifically, the Committee recommends pleted a Board-approved treatment program and
that the Board collect and disclose to the public continues to maintain his/her sobriety. In order
to guarantee public safety:
the following:
1) the Board should conduct
an annual review of all approved
1) all convictions of felonies
treatment programs with respect
during the past ten years; and
to their efficacy in monitoring and
2) all convictions of serious
enforcing physician compliance;
misdemeanors (e.g., assault and
2) attendance at requiredAA
battery, larceny, etc.) during the
meetings should be monitored in
past ten years.
accordance with current practices
Convictions shall include nolo
accepted by the AA community;
contendere pleas and cases where
sufficient facts of guilt have been
3) the Board and /or PHS
should
conduct an assessment
found and the matter has been
and make written findings concontinued without a finding (encerning whether it is safe for the
tered without a finding of guilt).
physician to practice without
The above convictions shall be disclosed
limitation during the initial stages
of recovery, or whether some rewhether or not they are related to the practice of
strictions should be imposed unmedicine.
til the physician demonstrates a
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sufficient track record of sobriety;
and
4) if the physician-patient
resumes the use of alcohol or
drugs or violates any other material condition of the program, the
Board should conduct an immediate disciplinary hearing to determine whether restriction on
the physician's practice of medicine would be imposed. The only
exception to an automatic disciplinary hearing would be if any
infraction or "slippage" was selfreported by the doctor and the
doctor agreed: a) to enter more
intensive treatment, such as an
in-patient program; and b) to sign
a voluntary agreement for appropriate medical practice restrictions.
In addition, we recommend the following:
Medical education and post-graduate
training
The Board should disseminate factual data
about a physician's education and training background to the public in an effective manner.
The Board should treat records detailing academic and training performance prior to licensure
as confidential. However, the Board should disclose information about a physician's failure to
complete a residency training program, where
the physician has been expelled, suspended, or
invited to take a leave of absence due to competency or character concerns, under circumstances
where procedural due process was afforded the
physician.
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Employment and credentialing
Physician-specific employment and
credentialing history of his or her practice of
medicine should be released in published form.
(See section entitled "Creation of Physician Profiles").
The Board should disclose any restrictions on
a physician's license or privileges, such as:
1) the surrender of a
physician's medical license or
privileges in any state whether or
not voluntary, if considered by the
licensing or privilege-granting
entity to be a disciplinary action;
2) a physician's resignation
from practice in a particular state
or from a medical staff if the resignation is considered a disciplinary action, or if it was offered to
avoid investigation or disciplinary action;
3) the denial of a medical license in any state for any reason;
and
4) restrictions on or denial of
participation or enrollment because of issues related to competency or character in a system
where a third party pays all or part
of a patient's bill.

Methods of release
Creation of physician profiles
The Committee believes that to release adverse
information (e.g., a negative malpractice history)
in isolation would tend to magnify and exaggerate the importance of an adverse event in what
Volume 8, number 2

may be an otherwise unblemished career of accomplishments. Therefore, the Committee recommends that the Board create a "Physician Profile" containing essential information about a
physician's education, training, employment and
character. This type of format will provide the
patient community with a ready reference to a
particular doctor. Below is a sample of the type
of information that should be included in the profile:
" Name
"Office phone number(s) and
address(es)
- Nature of practice (group
practice, solo practice, hospital
staff)
"Number of years in practice
"Medical license status
" Premedical and medical
schools, years attended and degrees awarded
• Postgraduate training
"Specialty
" American Specialty Board
certification and recertification,
and eligibility for certification.
- Current employment, including faculty appointments
- Health care facilities where
physician holds privileges
- Plans in which physician is a
provider
- Refereed journal articles and
book chapters
"Honors and awards
" Board or hospital disciplinary findings
* Criminal convictions
"Malpractice summary (coin1995-1996

pared with norm for specialty)
Accurate information
In disclosing information to the public, the
Board is obligated to take all steps necessary to
assure that the information which it releases to
the public about individual physicians is accurate and complete. The Board should provide
the individual physician with an advance copy
(a galley) of any information intended to be published so that the physician has an opportunity
to correct factual inaccuracies.
Interpreting the data
To insure that the information disclosed is reported in a fair manner, the Board should provide explanations and interpretations of the information being released, e.g.,
1) medical malpractice information should be released in
specialty comparison format;
2) data concerning settlement of malpractice claims
should be discussed in light of
current tort system realities of
settlement practice; and
3) specialty certification
procedures should be explained.
Consumer outreach
The Board should become an active and strong
voice for consumer protection in the health care
field. Its mission should include a commitment
to an education and outreach program for consumers on general issues of health care delivery.
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Consumer advocacy

Commitment

The Board should develop vehicles to inform
consumers about its operations and information
it has available to them, so that the Board's services and the information it retains can be routinely utilized.
The Board should be accountable to the public for its performance and should make public
information documenting the way it has done its
job.

The Board believes that tools and funding
alone, although essential, will not bring about
the strong leadership needed to protect the public interest. These must be accompanied by a
firm commitment on the part of the Board to
enforce the standards that will provide maximum
protection to the public.

Board's resources and

commitment
Resources
We recommend that the responsibilities delegated to the Board should not go as "unfunded
mandates." Therefore, any proposed budget
should consider the staffing, technical support,
and information systems necessary to achieve the
important and attainable goals outlined in the
Committee's report.
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